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Brief of Defendants - Respondents
Salt Lake County, et al.

N A T U R E O F T H E CASE
This is an action attacking the zone classification
by Salt Lake County of appellants' property located
"•
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in the canyons east of the Salt Lake Valley. The lawsuit is divided into four causes of action. The first
alleges that the zoning classification constitutes a taking
without compensation. The second alleges a conspiracy
among numerous County officials to deprive appellants
of the use of their property. The third is in the form of
a declaratory action seeking to invalidate zoning classification of appellants' property. The fourth seeks a
writ of mandamus requiring respondents to issue building permits to certain of the appellants.

D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
The appellants' First and Second Causes of Action
were dismissed by the Honorable G. H a l Taylor prior
to trial. Appellants' Third and Fourth Causes of Action were dismissed by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson after a six-day trial on the merits. The court held
the zoning classification of appellants' property was
reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious and did not
constitute a taking under the Utah or United States
Constitution. The court found that appellants had
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior
to bringing this lawsuit by appealing the decision of
Salt Lake County not to issue building permits to appellants to the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment. The court further found that appellants had not
met the requirements for a building permit.
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R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court's
decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In May of 1971, the Salt Lake County Commission enacted a temporary regulation which required
approval of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission prior to the issuance of a building permit for commercial or industrial developments in the canyons east
of Salt Lake Valley. Ex. P - l l . This regulation was
enacted by the Salt Lake County Commission pursuant
to the power granted the County under Utah Code
Annotated 17-27-19. Mr. Jerry Barnes, a member of
the Planning staff for Salt Lake County, testified the
regulation was put into effect to control development
in the canyons until studies could be made to develop
a comprehensive zoning plan for the canyon areas. R455. Ex. D-4.
On November 10,1971 the Salt Lake County Commission zoned the canyons FR-50 pursuant to the application and recommendation of the Salt Lake County
Planning Commission. Ex. P - l , P-9, P-14. The F R
zoning permits single family dwellings, agriculture and
accessory uses as permitted uses. Ten other uses are permitted in the F R zone upon the owner of property obtaining a conditional use permit from the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission. The conditional uses al-
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lowed in the F R zone include, among others, dwelling
groups, planned unit developments, commercial and
private recreation, logging and mineral extraction. Ex.
D-64, Section 22-9a. The FR-50 classification requires
a minimum of 50 acres for development. However, a
single family dwelling may be built on any parcel of
land under the minimum acreage requirement existing
at the time the zoning went into effect. Ex. 64, Section
22-2-2. At the time the FR-50 zoning was implemented
in November of 1971, the studies with regard to each
specific piece of property in the canyon were not completed and the County Commission indicated at that
time that the zoning would be changed for areas which
were appropriate for higher density development when
the canyon studies were completed. Ex. P-14. On
June 14 of 1972, zoning classification for many areas
of the canyons was amended. Ex. P-3.
Appellants are owners of certain patented mining
claims in the canyon area, particularly Little Cottonwood Canyon. On October 1, 1971, certain of the appellants applied for building permits to build two fourplex condominiums on their property located in the
Albion Basin area above the city of Alta in Little Cottonwood Canyon. Ex. P-24, Ex. P-25. These two
fourplexes were the initial phase of an extensive condominium development in the area. Ex. P-26, R-288289. Appellants were not issued a building permit at
that time for their condominium development because
they failed to obtain the approval of the Planning Commission for building permits under the temporary regu-
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lations in effect at that time in the canyons and because
they did not have an adequate water supply acceptable
to the City-County Board of Health. Finding No. 10.
In June of 1972, much of appellants' property in the
Albion Basin area was rezoned from FR-50 to F R - 1 .
Ex. D-66, Ex. P-3. The FR-1 classification requires
a minimum of one acre for development.
On March 25, 1973, appellants filed their lawsuit attacking the canyon zoning.

POINT I
T H E ZONING ORDINANCE ZONING
T H E CANYONS E A S T OF SALT L A K E VALL E Y WAS V A L I D L Y E N A C T E D BY T H E
S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y COMMISSION.
Utah Code Annotated 17-27-9 sets forth the powers and duties of the Planning Commission with regard
to making a zoning plan for the unincorporated territory within the County.
"The county planning commission of any
county may, and upon the order of the board of
county commissioners in any county having a
county planning commission, shall make a zoning plan or plans for zoning all or any part of
the incorporated territory within such county, including both the full text of the zoning resolution or resolutions and the maps, in representing
the recomendations of the commission for the
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regulation by districts or zones of the location,
heights, bulk, and sizes of buildings and other
structures, percentage of lot which may be occupied, the size of lots, courts and other oper
spaces . . . "
Section 17-27-10 requires the Planning Commission to
certify the plan to the County Commission and requires the County Commission to hold a hearing thereon prior to the adoption of any zoning regulation.
Under this section notice of such hearing must be published four times in a newspaper of general circulation at least 30 days prior to such hearing. Section
17-27-11 sets forth the manner in which zoning districts and regulations are enacted. Section 17-27-14
grants the power to the county commissioners to amend
the districts "or any other provisions of the zoning
resolution." Under this section, prior to such amendment, the Commission must hold a hearing, notice of
which must be published one time in a newspaper of
general circulation at least 30 days prior to the time
of the hearing.
Originally, zoning in the county was done by
districts, each district containing a separate text and
maps. However, since the adoption of the uniform
zoning ordinance for Salt Lake County in 1966, regulation of location, heights, bulk and size of buildings
and other structures, etc., has been done by zones.
A separate text is not enacted for each district. Ex.
P-63. The uniform zoning ordinance also contains
general provisions such as a parking provision which
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the County has applied to all unincorporated territory
in the county since the adoption of the uniform text.
Ex. P-63, Section 22-1 through 5; 22-31, 22-32 R-233.
The County has taken the position that since the uniform
ordinance applies to all unincorporated territory in Salt
Lake County, zoning of additional territory within the
unincorporated areas of the county is not original zoning but rather, is an amendment to the existing text
and ordinance and is covered by the notice requirements
of 17-27-14 and not by the requirements of 17-27-10.
This is the method followed by the County in enacting
the canyon zoning and much of the zoning elsewhere
in the County. R-397-404. The zoning plan certified
to the County Commission by the Planning Commission is contained in the text and map for the F i t zoning
in the canyons and meets the requirements of Utah
Code Annotated 17-27-9 for a zoning plan. Damick v.
Planning and Zoning Comm., 256 A.2d 428 (1969);
Hawkins v. City of Richmond, 286 N.E.2d 682 (1972);
Higginbotham v. City of the Village, 361 P.2d 191
(Okla. 1961); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414
Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
The objection raised by appellants is that the notice
of the hearing was published only once instead of four
times. This objection is not based on any claim of prejudice against the appellants or lack of opportunity to be
heard. Mr. Marvin Melville, who represented appellants
in this action, testified that all of the appellants had actual notce of the hearings on the canyon zoning. R-292,
Finding of Fact No. 7. Mr. Knowlton and Mr. Mel•
•

•

•

7

.
!

. v.
•

.

.

.

•
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ville were both present and participated in the hearing
on the canyon zoning held on October 6, 1971, for which
appellants claim the notice requirements were not met.
Ex. P-14. Four to five hundred people attended this
hearing. Ex. P-6. Nowhere during that hearing or
in the trial below did appellants claim any prejudice
or lack of opportunity to be heard on the basis of the
notice requirements followed by the County.
In Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 17 U.2d 300, 410
P.2d 764 (1966), this court rejected an attack on a
zoning ordinance on the grounds of improper notice
under Utah Code Annotated 10-9-5 where the plaintiffs had actual notice and participated in the zoning
hearing. The court noted that the plaintiffs had suffered no disadvantage because of having actual notice
of the hearing. See also Salt Lake County v. Public
Service Commission, 29 U.2d 386, 510 P2d 923 (1973).
The Naylor case is consistent with law in other
jurisdictions. In Dolomite Products Company v. Kipers, 241 N.Y. Supp. 2d 748, 752, (1963), the court
rejected plaintiffs' attack on the insufficiency of the
hearing notice where plaintiffs had actual notice of the
zoning hearing and participated in it. The court stated:

'

"The purpose of the requirement for publication of the notices is to advise those who may
have had any interest in, and desire to be heard
upon, the proposed administrative action. It
would seem that, as to those who had actual
notice of the hearing, the purpose of the statute
requiring publication, would have been served.
$
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I t has been held that such notice for appearance and participation in the hearing would constitute a waiver of any and all error in giving
notice..."
A similar result was reached in the case of Ridgewood Land Company vs. Simmons, 137 So.2d 532
(Miss. 1962), where plaintiffs, who had actual notice
of and attended the hearing, attacked the zoning ordinance on the grounds that the legal description in the
notice was incorrect. The court stated:
" 'One who has received notice of a hearing
and actually attends waives objection to insufficiency of the notice because the notice has
achieved its purpose.' "
Numerous other courts have ruled to the same effect.
Clark v. Wolman, 243 Md. 597, 221 A.2d 687 (1966);
Re Request for Rezoning by Yeany, 120 Ohio App. 20,
200 N.E.2d 813 (1963); Malley v. Clay County Zoning Commission, 225 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1969); Hilton v.
Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. App. 3rd 708, 86 Cal
Rptr. 754 (1970).
Appellants also attack the validity of the canyon
zoning on several other statutory grounds. None of
these allegations were specifically raised by appellants
in their complaint, their motion for summary judgment,
or their amended complaint during trial. Utah Code
Annotated 17-27-11, the requirements of which appellants allege the County did not comply with in enacting
the canyon zoning, grants to the County Commission
':"•'•'•
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the power to create zoning districts. No procedure or
method is set forth as to how such districts must be
created by the County Commissioners as they are in
Utah Code Annotated 17-27-17 which provides for
creation of districts by petition. The County Commission did create the Big Cottonwood, Little Cottonwood, Parley's and Millcreek Planning District on
the same date the FR-50 zoning was enacted for the
District. Ex. P - l . The County Commission appointed
commissioners for the district. R-419. If the County
erred in creating districts by this method, no prejudice
resulted to appellants. While most procedural requirements are regarded as mandatory, most courts will
uphold a zoning ordinance enacted where the legislative procedures which substantially, if not literally,
comply with the statutory prescription. Naylor v. Salt
Lake City Corp., supra; Mulligan v. New Brunswick,
83 N.J. Super 185, 199 A.2d 82 (1964). This is especially true when no prejudice resulted from the error.
Brown v. Shelby, 360 Mich. 299, 103 N.W.2d 612
(1960). In any event, zoning of the County had been
made county wide by the time of trial and districts were
therefore no longer required. R-521.
Appellants also attack the canyon zoning on the
grounds that zoning ordinances have not been filed with
the County Recorder's Office and the maps have not
been filed with the Clerk's Office in the past pursuant
to the requirements in Utah Code Annotated 17-27-24.
The language and the purpose of this statute do not support appellants' contention that failure to comply with

10
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it's provisions affects the validity of the ordinance. The
obvious purpose of this statute is to make the ordinances
available to the public. Appellants do not allege they
were not aware of the canyon zoning or did not have
an access to the ordinance and in fact, all zoning ordinances are available to the public at the Planning
Commission. Nowhere does the statute specifically require the filing of a zoning ordinance as a prerequisite
to its effectiveness, nor does it state a time limit in
which this must be done. The requirement in Section
17-27-24 that the county commission "shall" file copies
of the ordinances is analogous to the requirement in
Section 17-27-4 that the planning commission "shall"
make a master plan of the county. The language in
neither section specially states compliance with its requirements are a prerequisite to the validity of zoning
ordinances. This court has specifically held that failure
of the planning commission to make a master plan does
not affect the validity of ordinances. Gayland v. Salt
Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961).
Because Utah Code Annotated 17-27-24 does not
require that its provisions be met by the county before
zoning ordinances became effective or invalidate ordinances for failure of the county to meet it requirements,
respondents submit the court should not read this requirement into the statute, the effect of which would be to
strike down all of the zoning in Salt Lake County.
Courts in other jurisdictions having similar statutes requiring that zoning ordinances be filed with clerks or in
the recorder's office have held that failure to comply
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with such requirements does not invalidate a zoning ordinance. Frost v. Village of Hilshire Village, 403 S.W.2d
836 (Texas 1966); DeLand v. City of Tulsa, 2Q F.2d
640 (8th Cir. 1928) ; Wright v. DeFatta, 142 So.2d 489,
Aff. 152 So.2d 10 (La. 1962),

POINT II
THE
LOWER
COURT
CORRECTLY
FOUND T H E ZONING PLAN FOR A P P E L LANTS' CANYON P R O P E R T Y IS REASONA B L E A N D N O T A R B I T R A R Y OR C A P R I CIOUS.
Under Utah Code Annotated 17-27-13, zoning
regulations may be enacted by counties "for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity or welfare of the present and
future inhabitants of the state of Utah . . ." This
Court has held that the exercise of the zoning power is
a legislative function and the wisdom of a zoning plan
is a matter which lies in the discretion of the authorities and may be set aside by the court only if confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitrary. Naylor v. Salt
Lake City Corp., supra; Dowse v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953); Phi Kappa
lota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212
P.2d 177 (1949). The lower court, after hearing evidence on the canyon zoning for six days, found the
zoning classification of appellants' property was not
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arbitrary or capricious but rather, was based on considerations of fire and police protection, access to property, avalanche protection, protection of the watershed,
availability of water and sewer, soil and slope protection,
landslide dangers, visual considerations, acknowledgment of existing facilities and slope. R-37, Finding
No. 10.
The evidence shows that the County has spent
thousands of dollars and many man hours to gather information and facts for the purpose of developing a
proper zoning plan for the use and protection of the
canyons. Topographical studies were made by the staff
of the Planning Commission of all privately owned
property in the canyons prior to the zoning amendments enacted in June of 1972. R-448-449. Numerous
public agencies and other sources were contacted by and
supplied information to the staff of the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission which prepared the zoning plan for the canyons. R-449. The Salt Lake City
Water Department supplied information concerning
culinary water supply from Little Cottonwood Canyon
which supplies a major percentage of the culinary water
supply for Salt Lake City Water Department. R-450.
Charles Wilson of the Salt Lake City Water Department, representing Mayor Gain, appeared at the hearings on the canyon zoning and submitted a statement
that Salt Lake City supported the canyon zoning plan
as the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Salt Lake City
could not alone solve the watershed problem, Ex. P-6.
Since Salt Lake City is a major supplier of culinary
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water to the residents of Salt Lake County located outside of Salt Lake City, (R-384) there can be no question
that protection of this watershed relates to the health
arid welfare of the residents of Salt Lake County.
Dr. David W. Eckhoff, Associate Professor of Civil
Engineering at the University of Utah, testified that the
University's Department of Civil Engineering conducted a study, in which he participated, to determine the effect of the continued increased use of Little
Cottonwood Canyon on the water supply from Little
Cottonwood Canyon. Ex. D-90, R-673-685. The study
showed that the number of coliform in the water has
been doubling since 1967 and if this trend continued
at the same rate, the water would exceed the maximum
coliform acceptable by the U.S. Public Health Service
for raw water supply by 1978. The study also showed
a direct relationship between land use intensity and
coliform count in the water. Dr. Eckhoff concluded
that only drastic prohibition of further human use of
the canyons could alter this trend. R-681. However,
the day usage of the canyon has increased from 165,000
in 1967 to 282,1000 in 1971. Ex. 66, p. 27.
.The U.S. Forest Service supplied information concerning avalanches and topography of the canyons.
R-449. Much of Little Cottonwood Canyon, is undevelopable because of soil erosion hazards, vegetation
problems, avalanche danger, and extreme slopes. Ex.
D-66, p. 45, p. 51, p. 53. A composite map in the
Master Plan shows very little of the land is suitable for
development. Ex. D-66, p. 69.
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The town of Alta, which is located immediately
below the Albion Basin, was contacted to determine its
zoning plan. All of Alta, except the present lodge
developments, are zoned FR-IOO, which requires 100
acres for single family dwellings and is more restrictive
than any canyon zoning in Salt Lake County. R-450.
The Soil Conservation Service, the City-County Health
.Department and the State of Utah also were contacted
and furnished information.
Mr. Julian Thomas, an expert in avalanches and
forest land appraisal formerly employed by the Forest
Service as the District Ranger for the Wasatch Front
area, testified as to the developability of each of appellants' 40 parcels of land involved in this lawsuit.
Exhibit D-86, which is a topographical map on which
all of appellants' parcels of land in the canyons are
located, makes it clear nearly all of their land is literally located on mountaintops. For instance, Mr. Melville admitted that Parcel 2 contains a vertical drop
of almost 1,600 feet. R-760. Mr. Thomas testified that
with the exception of three parcels of land in the Albion
Basin, none of the land is presently developable because of lack of water, access, steepness of the terrain
and avalanche danger. R-589-594. H e further testified
that much of the land is so steep that it would actually
take a rock climber to go over it. R-589. A summary
of this testimony is contained in Exhibit D-87 where
Mr. Thomas concludes only 2 per cent of the land is
developable at all.
15
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The evidence introduced by the County shows
numerous reasons justifying the zoning of appellants'
property in the Albion Basin area for single family
recreation use and not commercial or high density use
which is allowed in limited areas further down the canyon. Mr. Thomas testified that the avalanche danger
was greater in the Albion Basin area than in the Snowbird area. When the canyon zoning was being considered the sewer extended to the Snowbird area but
there were no plans to extend the sewer into the Albion
Basin area. R-458. In fact, the Forest Service denied
appellants' application to extend the sewer over Federal lands into the Albion Basin area. Ex. D-74. Mr.
Thomas testified the road to the Albion Basin is owned
by the Forest Service and is only left open in the
summer months. R-622. A ski run crosses the road in
the winter and so it would be very difficult to open it
in the winter. R-572. Mr. Melville testified the only
winter access into the Albion Basin is by snowmobile or
by using the ski lift and hiking cross-country. R-265.
This lack of winter access could cause problems of fire
and police protection if the property were developed
commercially. R-705. Appellants' property in the Albion Basin is adjacent to a public campground which
the staff of the Planning Commission felt was not compatible with commercial development. R-460, R-706.
Finally, the visual impact of high density development
in the Albion Basin area would be much greater than
in the Snowbird area because the Snowbird area is
down in the canyon.
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The present zoning of appellants' property in Little
Cottonwood Canyon is consistent with the master plan
for the area which was prepared by Eckbo, Dean, Austin
and Williams, a land consulting firm from San Francisco, at the expense of over $19,000 to the County. Ex.
D-66, R-497. This plan calli for limited development in
the Albion Basin area. Ex. D-66, p. 6. Mr. Clayne
Ricks, Director of the Planning staff for the County,
testified that further studies have been contracted by
the County in the areas of transportation, land use
capacity and economics for the canyons. R-706.
Zoning in the canyons has not been done haphazardly or arbitrarily. Rather, it is a continuing process
based on scientific studies gathered by County planners, other government agencies and professional consultants. It is hard to imagine how the County could
have been more thorough in planning for proper use
of land in the canyons. The evidence from these studies
makes it apparent that if we are to protect the natural
resources in our canyons, development must be restricted and controlled. The present zoning plan for
the canyon is designed to protect natural resources in
the canyons while at the same time allowing limited development of private property in the canyons. Respondents would submit that the evidence fully supports the
lower court's finding that this is a reasonable zoning
plan for our canyons.
._..
; ^ ^ -
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POINT III
THE
LOWER
COURT
CORRECTLY
H E L D T H A T T H E CANYON ZONING DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE A T A K I N G OF A P P E L LANTS'PROPERTY.
The very purpose of zoning is to limit and control
the uses of property. The fact that a zoning ordinance
denies a property owner the highest and best use of
his land does not make it unconstitutional. Chevron
Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 22 U.2d 143, 449 P.2d 989
(1969); Board of County Commissioners v. Kay, 240
Md. 690, 215 A.2d 206 (1965); Bichmark Bealty Co.
v. WUttlif, 226 Md. 273,173 A.2d 196 (1961); Appeal
of Ligget, 291 Pa. 109, 139 A. 619 (1927); Bidgewood
Land Co. v. Moore, 222 So.2d 378 (Miss. 1969);
Wright v. Littleton, 483 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1971). In the
latter case the court noted that a zoning ordinance
which does not allow a landowner to use his property
in the most profitable manner is not unconstitutional
since the limitation of use is an essential and fundamental purpose of all zoning.
Likewise, the fact that a zoning ordinance reduces
the value of a particular parcel of land does not make
tne ordinance unconstitutional provided the regulation
bears a reasonable relationship to the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the community. Leary v. Adams,
226 A.2d 472, 147 So. 391 (1933); White Lake v.
Amos, 371 Mich. 693, 124 N.W.2d 803 (1963); Udell
V. McFadyen, 40 Misc. 2d 265, 243 N.Y.S.2d 156
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(1963); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery
County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969);
Hedrich v. Kane County, 117 111. App.2d 169, 253
N.E.2d566 (1969).
I t is clear from the numerous reasons set forth in
Point I I of respondents' brief that the canyon zoning
relates to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
citizens of this valley and therefore was correctly upheld
by the court even if appellants had established a substantial reduction in the value of their land. However, based
upon the testimony of appellants' own expert, the
lower court found that the evidence did not establish
a substantial change in value. Appellants' expert testified as to the value of appellants' property in the Albion Basin before and after the canyon zoning became
effective in November of 1971. H e offered no testimony with regard to the other properties involved in
the lawsuit. His testimony regarding the property in
the Albion Basin was based entirely on two sales of
property which he thought were prior to the enactment
of the canyon zoning: The first, a sale at $40,000 an
acre to a Mr. Cahill and the second at the equivalent
of $37,634 also to Mr. Cahill from a different seller.
R-301-302. Appellants' appraiser testified there were
no other comparable sales after the effective date of
the FR-50 zoning. R-302. On the basis of these two
sales he testified that in his opinion the land was worth
$32,000 prior to the zoning and then he estimated the
value of the land after the zoning. However, the option agreement on the second sale to Mr. Cahill was
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exercised in 1972 after the implementation of the F R 50 zoning and not before as the appraiser had mistakenly assumed. Ex. D-100, R-737. Thus, what actually
happened is Mr. Cahill paid approximately the same
price for property prior to and after the enactment of
the FR-50 zoning. On the basis of this testimony the
lower court found that the appellants had not established a substantial reduction in the value of their land
because of the FR-50 zoning.
There are numerous cases upholding zoning ordinances or denying applications for zoning amendments where the economic effect on the property involved is much more severe than the affect of the canyon zoning on appellants' property.
This Court, in Chevron Oil Company v. Beaver
County, supra, upheld the refusal of Beaver County
to rezone from agricultural land worth $20 an acre to
highway service land worth $10,000 an acre.
A "forest preserve district" requiring six acre minimum lot sizes in the town of Sanbornton, New Jersey,
was upheld in Steel Hill Development Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) where many
of the same considerations for protecting the environment were involved as are present in our own canyons.
In that case, the court stated:
"We recognize as within the general welfare,
concerns relating to the construction and integration of hundreds of new homes which would
have an irreversible effect on the area's ecolog-
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ical balance, destroy scenic values, decrease open
space, significantly change rural character of this
small town, put substantial burdens on the town
for police, fire, sewer and road services . . ."
„ Another area where courts have weighed the public
interest in protecting the environment against the allegation of taking of property without compensation
in deciding the validity of zoning ordinances is flood
plain zoning. These ordinances have been upheld even
though they place severe restrictions on the use of
property where property owners were left with a reasonable use of their property and the evidence established the zoning related to the health, safety, and welfare of the people. Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24
Cal. App. 3rd 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972) ; Famularo
v. Board of County Commissioners of Adams County,
505 P2d 958 (Colo. 1973), Turnpike Realty Co. v.
Townof'Dedham, 284 NE2d 891,900 (Mass. 1972).In
the latter case the court upheld a flood plain ordinance
even though it placed severe restrictions on building on
plaintiff's property causing a reduction in the value of
his land from $431,000 to $53,000. The court emphasized the dangers to the community from overdevelopment, the same danger which is present in our canyons
and concerned the County representatives who enacted
the canyon zoning.
4

'Although it is clear that the petitioner is substantially restricted in the use of the land, such
resrictions must be balanced against the potential harm to the community from overdevelopment of a flood plain area."
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Still another area where the courts have upheld
severe restrictions on the development of land is the area
of shoreline and wetlands control. A landmark case in
this area is Candlestick Properties Inc. v. San Francsico
Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 89
Gal. Rptr. 897 (1970). In this case the court upheld
the McAteer-Petris Act under which the San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission denied
a permit to plaintiffs therein to deposit fill on their
property located on the bay. Plaintiffs alleged that the
property had no value for any other purpose and alleged
the taking without compensation. The court noted
changing conditions and their effect on the environment
stating:
"In short, the police power, as such, is not confined within the narrow circumspection of precedence, resting upon past conditions which do
not cover and control present day conditions . . .
that is to say, as a commonwealth develops politically, economically, and socially, the police
power will likewise develop, within reason to
meet the changing conditions." 89 Cal Rptr at
905
The court noted the danger to the Bay by allowing
continued uncontrolled filling.
"In those sections the legislature has determined the bay is the most valuable single natural
resource of the entire region and changes in one
part of the bay may affect all other parts, that
the present uncoordinated haphazard manner in
which the bay is being filled threatens the bay
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i

itself and is therefore enimical to tl 1** welfare of
both present and future residents of the bay area;
and that a regional approach is necessary to protect the public interest in the hay." X'.i CaI H \-\\
at 905.

1 b" ! uii(iaj!i«'iif:ii rule governing all the cast's invoking an allegation of a taking is that i.* sustain vich
an a d c g . m o n . Hie a g g r i e v e d p a r t y mu^t -ium that Mu

enforced restrictions upon MIS property uill preclude
its use for any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted.
Famularo v. Board of County Cornrnisdoners of Adams
County, supra; Fertitta v. Brown, 252 Md. 594, 251
A.2d 212 (1969):; Phoenix v. Burke, 452 P.2d 722
(Ariz. 1009); Schour r. Lynhrool\
25 App. D h . 2d
Ht: JA\H N . V . S . 2d :>7 7 [ ItMMi). In the ease herein appellants attempt to show a iaking by claiming that the
F R - 5 0 does not allow Ihcm to build on any parcels
under 50 acres; however, this is not true. A s appellants
well known, the zoning ordinance permits a single family
dwelling on any parcel of land existing at the time a
zoning ordinance is enacted setting minimum lot sizes
greater than the size of the existing parcel. Section 222-2, Revised Ordinances of Salt L a k e County, 1968.
E x . P-63, R-348. The Planning Commission specifically considered this fact when recommending the passage of the canyon zoning. R-524. This was also stressed
at-the hearing on the F R - 5 0 . Kx J'-M
in the u-ea
where appellants applied t*> build their tv.»» fourplexes,
which is zoned F R - 1 , they had an approved subdivision
prior to' the enactment '^ the canyon /miing f,-* ^0
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lots. Ex. P-43. Under the present canyon zoning ordinance appellants may build a single family dwelling
on each of the 30 lots in the subdivision and a single
family dwelling on each other parcel of land owned by
the appellants in the canyon under 50 acres. In fact,
Mr. Knowlton has built a cabin on a lot less than one
acre since the enactment of the canyon zoning. R-501.
In the Albion Basin alone the present canyon zoning
classification permits approximately 100 single family
cabins to be built. R-707.
Appellants in their lawsuit offered no testimony
that classification of their land for single family residences would cause them to lose any money they have
invested in the land. In fact Mr. Melville testified the
land is old mining claims, some of which was acquired
at tax sales. R-282. They only tried to show, unsuccessfully, that they could earn more money if it were zoned
in a different manner. This same contention was rejected by this court in the Beaver County case. Obviously, there is no question single family recreation
homes for which appellants' property is zoned, is an
appropriate use of the property and an economically
feasible use of the property.
Appellants' allegations that the zoning of their
property was a conspiracy among numerous County
officials and the Forest Service to preserve it for public use is not supported by the facts. The zoning of
appellants' property in the Albion Basin was a small
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part of a comprehensive zoning plan for all of the canyons east of Salt Lake County. W h e n the canyon zoning went into effect, appellants' property was zoned
i i«.-.yO in the same manner as all other property in the
canyons. !i. ,*-.:•• • i MJ72, much of appellants' Albion
Basin property was rezoned (Vtm TH •- : • VH- .Jthough a great deai o* the canyon remain*, o j 'he
••<• restrictive F R - 5 0 . Properties surrounding api" nants' property are zoned in the same classification as
is appellants' property. K\ D<>8. There has been no
different treatment in the zoning of ap;> UanU property than :ai rhe zoning o>' any i-f I he properties surrounding their property. The numerous differences between appellants' property and the limited properties
zoned for higher density use lower in the canyon have
been set forth in Point I I . The fact that a hundred
residences may be built in the Albion Basin alone is
inconsistent vvith the iheon. thai the County is attempting to prevent building in the area.
Commissioner McClurc testified the zoning of appellants' property was not implemented to allow public
purchase of the area at a lower price, but rather, as a
part of comprehensive zoning plan for all of the private
owned land in the canyons, R.-200-'J0(i, R-445. -1>
Campbell. l ) i r e b » - "f the Planning Commission in
1971 testified that nn member of t l v Commission had
tried to influence the zoning plan they recommended
!•»>!• ..:i<»rtM>n in the eanvon*-. K-'*-H Mr Thomas from
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the Forest Service also testified that the Forest Service
did not try to influence the zoning plan that the County
adopted. R-611. On the basis of this testimony the
court found that there was no giant conspiracy among
the respondents to zone appellants' property in a manner that it could be purchased at a lower price or preserved for public use. Finding No. 11. Rather, the
evidence showed that the public officials implemented
the canyon zoning to control the development boom
before irreparable damage was done to the land and
natural resources in the canyons, both public and private.

P O I N T IV
T H E L O W E R COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED A P P E L L A N T S ' F O U R T H CAUSE
OF ACTION SEEKING A BUILDING PERMIT.
A.

Appellants did not meet County requirements for
a building permit.

The lower court found that appellants did not
meet County requirements of the Planning Commission
and the requirements of the City-County Board of
Health for a building permit. Finding of Fact No.
10. This finding is supported by the record. Mr. Hoff-
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man. Hi<i Supervisor of W a t e r and Sewage Sanitation
for HM Citv-County Board of Health, ttstifiVd that
appellants' oiiginal source of water for the proposed
condominium development was not adequate because it
dried up during the w i n t e r months and informed appellants they would have to seek an alternative source.
K-:*7!»-'i8;J. Mr. Melville admitted at toal th;it
source was not adequate in HK wmbv. K-^io
Appellants then proposed a second source for the fourplex condominiums; however, this source was not completed or approved before the zoning was implemented
in the canyons. R-281. Although appellants applied
t«.. Mil County for a building permit for two foir'plex
eondominiums, Mr. Melville testified this was \h* first
step in a major condominium development in the .\W n
Basin area. R-29. Appellants' building plants reflect
a development for 11 condominiums consist ing of four
units each. E x . P-18. liecau.se appellants contemplated a major development in the area and because
M : 5. iff man had certain questions a- to (lie capacity
*ni-i f'ftvl oi; ti: • watershed *»f qmellanlN* proposed
iimu i tunnel water source, it was referred 1 *> the State
Engineer for review. R-380-388, This is the same approach the County took in the Snowbird development
in the canyons. R-38t>. The fact that the immediate
development nuiy not ha\e required the approval o,
the Stal<- in n- v. a\ prevents the Couivh* from seeking the assistance of tlv State wl^vc it i. needed.
Temporary zoning regulations in effect for the
canyons at the time appellants applied for their build-
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ing permits required the approval of the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission for the erection of a
building structure for "commercial or industrial purposes". Ex. P - l l . However, appellants did not obtain approval of the Planning Commission. Mr. Douglas Campbell, former director of the Planning staff,
testified that the longstanding interpretation of the
term "commercial" in the temporary zoning regulations
included multi-unit dwellings as such dwellings are
generally income producing developments. R-357. Mr.
Campbell further testified that other persons proposing
similar developments as the appellants in areas under
temporary regulations have been required to obtain
approval of the Planning Commission prior to the issuance of a building permit. R-357. The Snowbird development for condominiums obtained Planning Commission approval. R-501, Ex. D-70. The wording and
purpose of the enabling statute authorizing counties
to enact temporary zoning regulations support this
interpretation by County officials.
Utah Code Annotated 17-27-19 authorizes the
County to enact temporary zoning regulations requiring
Planning Commission approval of a structure to be used
for "business, commercial or industrial purposes". By
using both the terms "business" and "commercial" in the
statute, the legislature apparently intended a "commercial" purpose to include more than the building of a
"business". Development of an eight-unit condominium
involves sale, lease or rental of some or all of the units
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and is normally Untight of as a "commercial" venture.
The purpose of the temporary regulations obviously is
to control certain types of development while the P l a n ning Commission is developing a zoning plan for the
By granting counties ?h> =,#!. -> rMpnre
P l a n t i n g Commission approval •!
business, conimercial and industrial de\cIopinents" d u i n g thi*- <nterim period, the legislature was concerned with the control of the types of uses which necessarily have1 the m. 4
impact on an area and t h m . which need to be limited as
to location in a zoning plan. Multi-unit dwellings are
. \h\< category as they generate addfhonai traffic
in an area and have an impact on public s e n i c e v H ^
Respondents would suhmit County officials were correct
in inquiring appellants to obtain Planning Commission
V
d*M-rlojtm''1,1
: ,j M ,*-,,*-,,! f^r Ov*'" "onflnminiiIP
^

\[>pellants failed to exhaust Hir^r administrative
remedies prior to bringing MI if.

[ 1 tah Code : \ ni 10 tated 1'
follows i

'

5 1953 pi ovides as

" Vppeals to the Hoard of An .u^+ment may be
MUV, n by any person aggrieved . . . by the decision
of any administrative officer or agency based upon or made in the enforcement of the provision
of the zoning resolution . . .
: pon appeals, the Board of Adjustment shall
have the following powers: I T o hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the* appellant
that there is any error in any order, requirement
decision
wjiisal n u d e by any administrative
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official or agency based on or made in the enforcement of the zoning resolution . . . "
The statute proceeds to delegate to the Board of Adjustment the power to promulgate rules of procedure
describing time limits in which an appeal must be made.
Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment General Rules
of Procedures, July 16,1963, No. 3, provides:
"An appeal taken to the Board of Adjustment
must be taken within 90 days after the cause of
action arises or the appeal will not be considered
by the Board of Adjustment." Ex. D-102.
In Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Company, 15
U.2d 305, 308, 392 P.2d 40 (1964), this Court stated:
' T h e 90-day limitation of Section 17-27-16 is
designated to assure speedy appeal to the proper
tribunal of any aggrievance that a party may
have who is adversed by a decision of an administrative agency."
In that case, which dealt with the issuance of a building
permit to construct a mobile trailer park, this Court
ruled that since the aggrieved party had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the
adverse decision to the Board of Adjustment within 90
days after the cause arose, the suit was properly dismissed by the lower court for failure of the appellant
therein to exhaust his administrative remedies.
In the case herein, appellants were denied a building permit by Ronald Ivie of the County Building and
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Zoning D e p a r t m e n t on the basis thai appellants' proposed condominium fourplexes were "commercial"
buildings within the meaning of the temporary zoning
regulations in effect for the canyons at that time and
needed zoning approval prior to the issuance of the
permit. R-136. I n addition, the permit w: s denied liecause appellants did not have -u. ide<|uat< wi^cr Mip~
ph !f»r the development. This was a decision of an
i<
Moralise official which should have been appealed
to the Board of Adjiistment pursuant to the mpr••*
merits of Utah Code Annotated 17-27- in The iouer
eoun was correct under the authority iA' the Lnnd ease
in dismissing appellants' Fourth Cause .
\ , ? j . ». U% •
cause of the failure of appellants to do n Tin fact
thai appellants in their lawsuit also challenge zoning
ordinances later enacted for the same piece of property
in which they sought a building permit has no effect
on the jurisdiction of the Board of Adjust menl !o der'uh Mir building permit question.

CONCLUSION"
Protection ol tlie naiurai resources in our canyons
is f vital importance to the health, safety and welfare
of e . e n resident in this valley, including" property
owners in the ranvon. Almoxj nothing ei-u!d more directly relate t«. !hc health safety and welfare of the
!
" Mian the protection of the watershed. This alone
• i be sufficient to justify the reasonableness of the
\s - h n • ^ !hr -'-anvons. However, the evidence
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showed there are numerous other conisderations that
support the zoning plan. Slope, avalanches, erosion and
landslides make a great majority of property in the
canyons undevelopable at all. Lack of sewer and water,
access, police and fire protection make high density development of the Albion Basin undesirable. The beauty
of the canyons is an asset to this community which must
be protected for all to enjoy. This does not mean public
use of private property but only that private development in the canyons be limited and controlled so as not
destroy this beauty. This is what the canyon zoning
plan attempts to do.
Our legislature specifically mentions the protection
of the health, safety and welfare of the "future inhabitants" of the state as well as the present inhabitants as
one of the proper aims of zoning. In our canyons, more
than anywhere else in the state, proper land use planning today is essential to protect the welfare of our
children and grandchildren. The canyon zoning plan,
as applied to the appellants' property in the canyon,
allows them the right to build an extensive single family
residential development on all their lots in the Albion
Basin regardless of the size of such lots. On their
property in the Albion Basin zoned F - l they may develop any parcel over one acre for any uses allowed
in the F R zoning. On their other property in the
canyons which is zoned FR-50, most of which is undevelopable at all, they may develop any parcels over 50
acres, many of which appellants own, for any of the
uses allowed in the FR-50 zoning. On any parcels under
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50 acres they may develop a single family home. \\ ;.- u
weighed against the numerous essential considerations
supporting the need for this zoning in the canyons, this
regulation of use does not support appellant allegations
that their land has been takrn without compensation.
For the reasons s t a u u m ii«-«t i ^ p o i ^ u m ^ -.VIH-HI
suhinil Hi* dcri^n*- -*" M».. 1MU*M .-oiirt should be sust;im< ; .'

Respectfully sul.ii.uw .i,
R. P A U L V A ^ D A M
Salt Lake County A l t n i m s
J OHIN

*•

\ \

Kh\

Chief f >\ il Denntv County Attorney
KE'JST S. L E A V I S
D e p u t y Salt T,ak-" 0 * u n t . .:r t -».:t. <
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents, Sali Lak- 1 C o u n n . > * d.
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